Party change and cleavage formation : the effects of value change on the Spanish party system by Torcal Loriente, Mariano et al.
Party Change and Cleavage Formation: The Effects of
Value Change on the Spanish Party System
Mariano TORCAL
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
José Ramón MONTERO
Instituto Juan March
Working Paper n.132
Barcelona 1997
Since the mid-1920s, party systems in Western democracies have
developed around the cleavages generated by the modern secular state and
industrial society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). When the initial impact of these
forces subsided, Western Europe saw a period of political stability which was
reflected in the basic continuity in electoral results from the 1940s until the
beginning of the 1970s (Rose and Urwin 1970). The electoral volatility that many
scholars have seen since then has, however, challenged this pattern of stability
(Maguire 1983; Pedersen 1983; Crewe and Denver 1985)1. The literature on
«new politics», for instance, takes the value change hypothesis as the point of
departure for the explanation of electoral instability (Dalton et al. 1984). The
supporters of this approach maintain that the traditional structure of cleavages
which characterized Western politics has lost some of its significance in favour of
a new value-based cleavage along the materialist/postmaterialist dimension. As a
result, they go on to argue, the traditional left-right schema that lies behind the
structure of cleavages has also been affected (Knutsen 1989a; Inglehart 1977,
1984 and 1990a). They also assert that the rise and success of Green parties and
the proliferation of alternative electoral lists can be attributed to the increasing
prevalence of these new values (Müller-Rommel 1989 and 1990). Spain, like
most advanced industrial societies, is undergoing a cultural change (Torcal 1989
and 1992; Scarbrough 1995). Younger generations of Spaniards have
substantially different value systems, in which maximum priority is no longer given
to physical sustenance and safety, but rather to sentiments of belonging, self-
expression, and quality of life. As in other Western societies, the unprecedented
levels of economic prosperity, physical security, and education that have existed
over the last few decades are responsible for this shift. How value change has
affected Spanish party politics?
Much of our interpretation of mass politics in Western Europe is derived
from Rokkan’s and Lipset’s freezing hypothesis. Although widely accepted and
influential, this approach suffers from two problems. First, it pays scant attention
to the underlying values, as opposed to issues, which inform class and religious
conflicts (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, 43). Second, its treatment of the
relationship between social divisions and party politics is too deterministic, leaving
little room for human agency, that is, political leadership (Chhibber and Torcal
1997). More recently, Bartolini and Mair (1990, 212-220) have reformulated the
concept of cleavage, drawing a distinction between its three constituent elements:
social structure, values and beliefs, and institutional and organizational
arrangements. A cleavage, therefore, must not only have social and cultural
bases, but must also be institutionalized, developing its own «autonomous
strength» and acting «as an influence on social, cultural and political life» (1990,
218). In accordance with this definition of a cleavage, Knutsen and Scarbrough
(1995) have suggested that value change may be generating value voting at the
expense of cleavage voting precisely because of its lack of an institutional or
organizational dimension. Independently of the excessively strict interpretation of
the «institutional element» of the cleavage, this argument shows that the process
of cleavage formation and its consequences for the party system are still seen
from the «bottom-up», allowing little room for the role of the elites in the formation
of the institutional element of the cleavage. In contrast to this approach, we argue
here that elites and party strategies play an important role in the process of
cleavage formation. Thus, we maintain that value change is an emerging new
cleavage with potentially profound consequences for the party system, but it can
only be perceived if we consider two intervening factors: firstly, the generation
that individuals belong to; and secondly, the electoral strategies adopted by the
elites to capture the vote of postmaterialists.
In this paper, therefore, we will consider the extent to which value change
is affecting the Spanish cleavage structure. According to the traditional
formulation of cleavage theory, value change should lead to some modifications
in the party system. This is, for instance, the interpretation defended by Knutsen
and Scarbrough (1995). However, we contend that the link between these two
levels of a cleavage is mediated by the crafting of the political elites. In Spain,
some existing party elites are reacting to the presence of this new value conflict
and winning the electoral support of postmaterialists; as a result, no significant
change is occurring in the party system, nor are new parties emerging. Cultural
change, therefore, is not resulting in party system change, but is rather fuelling
party change, i.e., it is altering the character of some existing parties2. Hence, the
«autonomous strength» of the institutional dimension of a cleavage depends on
political crafting, and its consequences are not as self-evident as the traditional
interpretation of cleavages would tend to suggest. Furthermore, the effects of
value change on party politics are more noticeable if we take the existence of
different political generations into account since, according to Inglehart’s
hypothesis, value change is mostly affecting young generations. Thus, its impact
on party politics is more conspicuous among these generations than at the
aggregate level.
We begin by analysing the relationship between cultural change and
generational replacement in Spain, showing that replacement is the driving force
behind value change. In the rest of the article, we will try to relate the materialist/
postmaterialist dimension to some facets of Spanish politics. We will consider the
effects of value change on the structure of political cleavages, examining how
value change might be altering the ideological spectrum of some Spanish voters,
and conclude with an assessment of the effects cultural change has on the
Spanish party system. We will show that the effects of value change on both
become more visible if we take the intervening influence of generational
replacement and leadership into account.
MATERIALISTS AND POSTMATERIALISTS IN SPAIN
To what degree are postmaterialist values implanted in Spanish society?
To answer this question we have analyzed the data of six surveys carried out in
Spain in 1980, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 19943. From the data for the last
fourteen years shown in Table 1, it is evident that the percentage of
postmaterialists has increased slightly (with the exception of 1993), while the
decline in the percentage of materialists has been remarkable (from 62 per cent
in 1980 to 43 per cent in 1993 and 45 per cent in 1994)4. In Spain, therefore,
relatively high rates of economic growth did in time lead to relatively high rates of
decline in the proportion of materialists, but not a corresponding increase in
postmaterialist values, as Inglehart and Abramson (1994) maintain. These
affirmations, however, should be made with some caution in the light of the short
period of time studied.
On the other hand, the proportion of postmaterialists in Spain is very
similar to the average for ten European Union countries (excluding Spain and
Portugal), confirming that relatively high levels of GNP per capita predict relatively
high levels of postmaterialists (Inglehart and Abramson 1994, 346-350). The data
included in Table 1, however, also highlight some comparative differences. In
Spain, the percentage of materialists is higher than in other EU countries, while
the percentage of mixed individuals is lower. It seems, therefore that the relatively
high levels of GNP per capita resulting from very rapid economic growth have
given rise to a value change that is rather different from that found in other
European countries (Scarbrough 1995, 134): a significant proportion of
postmaterialists exists alongside the still majoritarian materialist presence5.
We argue that these peculiar characteristics of value change in Spain are
the result of the particular nature of the profound economic and social
transformation experienced in the country since the 1960’s6. The pace of
economic growth has produced levels of wealth comparable to other European
countries, but also distinct levels of access to this economic prosperity (security)
among Spaniards, due to the combination of still notable social inequalities and a
welfare state which was essentially constructed during the 1980s. These
conditions have given rise to a relatively high proportion of postmaterialists in
comparison to other EU countries, but also to the peculiar coexistence of these
postmaterialists with a wide plurality of materialists, even though the latter have
been declining in relative terms over the last fifteen years.
In Spain, as in other advanced industrial societies (Abramson and
Inglehart 1986, 1987, 1992 and 1995; Knutsen 1989b; Scarbrough 1995),
generational replacement is contributing to the spread of postmaterialism. In this
respect, we have used the percentage difference index (PDI) between
materialists and postmaterialists by cohorts in 1980, 1989, 1992, and 19937. As
can be seen in Figure 1, the younger cohorts account for a large proportion of the
postmaterialists, a tendency which is confirmed as each cohort comes of age.
Hence the PDIs between younger cohorts are generally lower than those
between older cohorts. Figure 1supports the hypothesis of cultural change and
generational replacement in Spain, and confirms the results of previous studies
(Orizo 1991; Montero and Torcal 1990 and 1992)8. Despite the overall
persistence of differences between cohorts, the data also suggest the presence
of period effects, as well as some instability in cohort differences, two tendencies
which are at odds with the generational replacement hypothesis.
The variations in the PDIs shown in Figure 1 can be attributed to three
kinds of effects. Those produced by influences associated with aging are age
effects; those produced by influences associated with birth cohort membership
are cohort effects; and those produced by influences associated with each period
of time are period effects9. In order to distinguish between these three effects, we
have used a longitudinal research design10. Our conclusion is that, although the
data reflect some period effects, the variability of postmaterialists is largely a
product of cohort effects, confirming the generational replacement hypothesis. As
can be seen in Table 2, different longitudinal models were used to study
separately the period, cohort, and age effects on the variations in a
postmaterialism index between 1989 and 1993. In the first Model in Table 2, we
regressed a postmaterialist index (factor scoring) on twenty dummy independent
variables, representing the nine different cohorts, nine age groups, and two
periods included in this design11. The coefficients of this partial regression
indicate that cohort effects explain most of the variability in the postmaterialist
index. Compared with the cohorts effects, the period and age effects were
negligible. The sign and magnitude of these coefficients show that the younger
the cohort, the higher the postmaterialist index. But none of the coefficients
generated by this model are statistically significant, a result which is due to the
high multicollinearity between these variables12.
After confirming the effect of multicollinearity on the absence of observable
statistical significance of cohort effects13, we attempted to resolve this problem
by transforming the age variable (quadratic and age minus the average age)14.
The influence of cohort effects on the dependent variable, the postmaterialist
index, is evident from the results of Model 2 in Table 2, providing further support
for the generational replacement hypothesis. The partial regression coefficients of
the younger cohorts were indeed both very high and statistically significant.
Although the partial regression coefficient of Period 2 is not very important (.126
from 0 to 1), it too is statistically significant, so showing the relative importance,
defended by some scholars (Shively 1991; Scarbrough 1995), of period effects in
the variability of postmaterialism.
We have further confirmed the significance of cohort effects by substituting
the nine cohort dummy variables with one variable representing the average
education of each cohort15. The results are included in Model 3 in Table 2. The
partial regression coefficients of average education by cohort were statistically
significant and in the expected direction (in accordance with the cultural change
hypothesis). No other regression coefficient was statistically significant. Indeed,
cohort replacement seems to be the major force driving value change in Spain.
Duch and Taylor (1993) have seen the relative importance of education over GNP
per capita on postmaterialism as the principal counter argument against the
scarcity hypothesis, which is one of the theoretical cornerstones of Inglehart’s
theory16. According to Dutch and Taylor, value change is the result of higher
levels of education, rather than different levels of economic prosperity. The
Spanish data also seemed to point to the centrality of education. The results of
Model 4 in Table 2, which includes the average GNP per capita by cohort,
highlights the importance of education as one of the principal factors behind
cultural change in Spain: the partial regression coefficient of average education
by cohort was the only significant one. In contrast, GNP per capita was not
statistically significant.
Despite this, however, we disagree with Duch’s and Taylor’s interpretation.
As Scarbrough (1995) argues, GNP per capita is only a very imperfect measure
of economic security17. This indicator only refers to the overall level of economic
prosperity at some point in the past, but does not capture other very important
factors shaping economic security, such as the degree to which a nation’s social
welfare system has developed. We contend that GNP per capita does not capture
economic security in Spain either. As argued above, rapid economic growth in
Spain has produced new social inequalities, whilst a fully-fledged welfare system
capable of compensating for these is still not in place, resulting in a notable
proportion of postmaterialists along with a wide plurality of materialists. In Spain,
as in other Western European societies (Scarbrough 1995, 154-6), education
better captures the different levels of economic security enjoyed by wide sections
of society; this is why education appears in Model 4 in Table 2 as the only
significant variable in defining value change. It should also be noted that Spain
has the highest unemployment rate among Western countries18, only confirming
that rapid economic growth has not benefited all sectors of Spanish society
equally. In this respect, Clarke and Dutt (1991) have argued that the rising levels
of unemployment during the 1980s have been producing, contrary to what the
cultural change hypothesis suggests, an increase in postmaterialism. Recently,
Inglehart and Abramson (1994 and 1995) have demonstrated that unemployment
has only fuelled a temporary increase in the number of materialists (period
effects). The Spanish case may contribute to this debate by showing that
consistently high levels of unemployment together with  rapid economic growth
have produced coexistence of significant number of postmaterialists with a
majority of materialists. Abramson’s and Inglehart’s (1993) argument that the
effects of economic growth  are different from the effects of economic security in
terms of value change are therefore correct. Economic growth alone cannot
produce fully-fledged value change. For this to take place, it must provide
economic security for the majority of the society and should be accompanied by
high levels of education. The distinctive features of value change in Spain are the
result of a combination of rising levels of education and the economic security
enjoyed by some sectors of Spanish society.
THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND VALUE
CHANGE IN SPAIN
In most Western Europe countries, the left-right schema summarizes the
universe of political conflicts and issues for people, making these more
understandable, meaningful, and manageable. More importantly, the meaning of
this schema is defined by the basic structure of conflicts in a given social system
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, 223). In Spain too, and in contrast to party
identification19, the images of left and right are firmly anchored, and reflect the
basic structure of political and social conflicts. The classical cleavages of Spanish
society are mostly represented on this ideological continuum, they have a major
influence on political attitudes and behaviour, and constitute the most important
frame of reference for evaluations of political parties, political leaders, and some
political institutions (Linz et al. 1981; Sani and Montero 1986).
Spaniards’ self-placement on the left-right scale has been very stable over
time (Montero 1994). But, as other scholars have noticed, the apparent
underlying stability of the scale may conceal an important change in its meaning
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). How important is the materialist/postmaterialist
conflict in defining the current meaning of the left-right continuum in Spain? To
answer this question, we have adopted two of the main approaches to the study
of political cleavages (Knutsen 1989a, 495). One approach has used statistical
techniques such as regression analysis to identify the different social
characteristics that may explain political preferences and behaviour. The other
has sought to identify empirical cleavages using dimensional analysis. In the next
two sections we will present the results obtained when these two approaches
were used to examine the effect of value change on the structure of political
cleavages in Spain.
Postmaterialism and the Structure of Political Cleavages
In order to assess the importance of the materialist/postmaterialist conflict
in defining the meaning of the ideological continuum, we regressed a
postmaterialist index (factor scores) on the left-right scale. We included in the
model two independent variables representing traditional cleavages in Spanish
society: materialist class conflict20 and the religious cleavage21. We also added
income level to the model in order to provide an objective measure of class.
Finally, since gender has been shown to have some effects on the ideology of
Spaniards (Díez Medrano et al. 1989), this variable was also incorporated.
Analysis of the 1993 data produces some interesting results. Table 3 immediately
suggests that class-consciousness and religious cleavages are still remarkably
important for the social definition of the left-right schema. Compared with the
impact of these variables, the postmaterialist and gender coefficients appeared to
be irrelevant. Do these results provide definitive evidence that value change has
had no significant impact on the left-right continuum? In order to answer this
question we must consider the distinct distribution of materialists and
postmaterialists in the different generations of Spaniards. As we have noted
above, rapid economic growth and social modernization in Spain has given rise to
a situation in which a relatively large number of postmaterialists coexist with the
plurality-holding materialists. Therefore, it could be expected that some traditional
cleavages would remain the dominant force defining the general structure of
political conflicts. But, as we have also seen here, the proportion of
postmaterialists is much higher among younger cohorts, and it is precisely these
generations which constitute the main source of changes in the structure of
political cleavages (Knutsen 1995, 181-182). Cohort differences, therefore, must
be introduced in order to ascertain the extent to which the generational factor
affects both the structure of political cleavages and their impact on the left-right
continuum. Table 4 confirms our expectations. We repeated the regression model
performed in Table 3 with the 1993 data, but this time including in the model a
new set of variables which represent the interaction of political cleavages and
cohort effects22. The resulting picture shows that subjective social class and
religiosity continue to appear significant despite the generation effects. But it also
shows the importance of the materialist/postmaterialist dimension in defining the
left-right schema when cohort interaction effects are specifically considered.
We contend that these results, together with the generational replacement
observed in the previous section, clearly indicate that traditional materialist
cleavages are giving way to new values in the constellation of meanings which
define political conflicts. Of the traditional cleavages, religiosity still exerts a
dominant influence, but it becomes significant only among older generations,
confirming the depolarizing effects of secularization in Spanish politics. Class
conflict also remains important. Therefore, it seems that in Spain, as in many
other Western European countries (Knutsen 1988; Inglehart 1990b and 1990c,
Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995), more value-oriented or ideological cleavages,
including new cultural and religious values, are increasingly those which shape
the left-right schema.
The changing meaning of the left-right schema and the increasing
importance of the materialist/postmaterialist conflict may be seen more clearly by
examining the relationship between the scale and various issues. A postelectoral
survey carried out in 1993 included ten questions referring to a selection of
socially and politically significant issue attitudes23. Respondents were asked to
place themselves on a 1 to 10 scale according to their opinion on two contrasting
statements related to basic issues24. A factor analysis of these ten scales (not
shown here) revealed the existence of four different dimensions. The first is the
religious/secular dimension, which is defined by the abortion issue and the
authoritarian/libertarian conflict25. The second dimension points to the conflict
between increasing social services and reducing taxes, and also includes the
issue of European economic integration. The third refers to the debate about the
privatization of public corporations and competition in the workplace. Finally, the
materialist/postmaterialist dimension encompasses the conflicting issues of
economic growth versus protection of the environment, and of citizen participation
versus rapid government decision-making. We have, therefore, created four
variables representing the individual scores on each factor obtained in the
analysis, and have regressed these four variables on the left-right scale. The
results show that all the dimensions (independent variables) are statistically
significant with the exception of the materialist/postmaterialist one26. However, if
we again take generational replacement into account, the picture is rather
different. We repeated the regression analysis including the interaction effects of
age and these four issue dimensions as independent variables. Although working
with pure interaction effects is always problematic27, the results, which can be
found in Table 5, are nonetheless illuminating. The interaction of age and the
materialist/ postmaterialist conflict now becomes one of the most important
variables defining the meaning of the left-right schema. The other issue
dimension that shows even more statistically significant interactions with age is
the religious/secular conflict, confirming once again the generational character of
the intense secularization process seen in Spanish society over the last twenty
years (Montero 1997). The meaning of the left-right schema in Spain is changing,
and generational replacement is one of the main forces behind this change.
Spatial Definition of Political Conflicts
What is the spatial configuration of the political conflicts produced by the
emergence of the materialist/postmaterialist dimension? The answer to this
question may be sought through recourse to the second analytical approach
mentioned above, which has attempted to identify empirical cleavages using
dimensional analysis. Figures 2 and 3 present the results for 1989 and 1993 of
non-metric multidimensional scaling analyses with the twelve items of value
change and the different positions on the left-right scale28. In 1989, the spatial
representation of the ideological scale on the horizontal axis almost exactly
reproduced the expected order from left to right; only the variables measuring the
centre-right and right positions deviated from the expected order (the right is more
to the left than the centre-right). This unusual exchange of positions seems to be
related to the presence of the authoritarian/libertarian value components within
the materialist/postmaterialist dimension (i.e., the presence of items such as
«fight crime» and «maintain order»). This is even more evident at the other end of
the ideological spectrum. Although the left and centre-left maintain a sequential
order in the horizontal dimension, they are quite distant in the vertical dimension.
The left variable is part of the libertarian cluster of items («freedom of speech»,
«more say in job» and «in government»), while the centre-left is closer to other
social concerns. As we have argued elsewhere (Montero and Torcal, 1994), as a
result of the major presence of the materialist/ postmaterialist value conflict,
Spanish materialists seem to be divided between pro-authoritarian and
materialists stricto sensu, while Spanish postmaterialists are apparently split
between pro-libertarians and those who have sociotropic concerns29. Indeed, it
can be seen that the interaction of these two conflicts of cultural change cuts
across the traditional cleavages in Spanish society, altering and redefining, as a
result, the spatial order of the ideological scale.
This finding is confirmed in Figure 3, even though we grouped the
ideological scale differently30. The counter-intuitive order of the ideological
categories is even more evident in the structure of the 1993 data. The left (L)
occupies a more extreme position than the extreme left (EL). On this
postmaterialist side, the extreme left is closer than the left to some materialist
concerns (such as «increase social programs»), while the left seems more
concerned with environmental protection. At the other end of the ideological
spectrum, the right (R) also occupies a more extreme position than the extreme
right (ER). The right is closer to items such as «fight unemployment» and «fight
inflation», whereas the extreme-right seems less orientated towards material
goals. The resulting paradox is that the extreme right and the extreme left are
closer to each other on the spectrum than the right and left.
We are tempted to conclude, therefore, that the new dimensions emerging
as a result of value change are cutting across the traditional cleavages in Spanish
society and so altering, at least partially, the meaning of the ideological left-right
continuum and the spatial definition of political conflicts. Moreover, as new
generations enter the political system, their new values could gradually
accentuate the transformation of existing political conflicts. But we, of course,
reject any kind of determinism. We are not suggesting here that all political
conflicts will eventually be based on the materialist/postmaterialist dimension.
There is already sufficient empirical evidence to show the complexity of the
interplay between new and traditional cleavages (Inglehart 1990a; Van Deth
1995). And this is particularly so in countries, such as Spain, which have
experienced almost simultaneously the consequences of rapid economic growth
and entrenched social inequalities in the context of a newly consolidated
democracy and a still recent welfare system. The survival of some of the more
enduring traditional cleavages, and the more remarkable persistence of
materialist demands resulting from varying levels of economic insecurity, will be
sources of potential conflict, as will the disputes over the strategies the political
elites design to deal with these conflicts.
THE EFFECTS ON THE SPANISH PARTY SYSTEM
Has this value change redefined the boundaries of political competition
between parties in Spain? To what extent has it affected the party system? From
one perspective, the Spanish party system changed remarkably little between the
electoral realignment which took place in 1982, and the 1993 and 1996 general
elections. This predominant-party system was dominated by the Socialist Party
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), whose strong electoral support
remained essentially stable until the slow recovery of the second party (the
conservative Partido Popular, PP) and its very narrow victory in March 1996. The
PSOE and the PP were the main competitors in the party system, winning a
combined average of three out of four votes, and obtaining eight out of ten seats
in the Congress of Deputies over the last fifteen years31. At the national level, the
party system includes a third significant party, Izquierda Unida (the United Left,
IU, a leftist coalition of small political groups dominated by the Communist
party)32, as well as various regionalist or nationalist parties (the most important of
which are the Catalan coalition Convergència i Unió (CiU) and the Basque
Nationalist Party (the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV)33.
During the late eighties and early nineties, value change seemed to be
defining new spaces of party competition as well as redefining old ones. Non-
metric multidimensional analysis with parties and value change items have been
used here to map this new spatial party competition34. In 1989, the materialist
side of the dimension appears to have been dominated by the conservative party.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the PP is the closest party to the authoritarian items.
It should also be noted that the PP and the small and now defunct centre-liberal
party (Centro Democrático y Social, CDS) are the two parties furthest away from
each other. They seem to compete for different electoral spaces even though
they are supposed to be ideologically close. It may be argued, once again, that
this reflects the significance of the authoritarian/libertarian value conflict. Figure 4
also clearly shows that, even though the supporters of these two parties are
prone to choose materialist values, PP voters tend to be more concerned about
authoritarian issues which are also important in defining the
materialist/postmaterialist dimension in Spain (Montero and Torcal 1994). At the
other extreme, IU seems to be closer to the postmaterialist/ libertarian items. The
Socialist party appears to be more distant from these items, especially with
respect to the most libertarian ones. This pattern confirms, as has been found in
many other countries, that traditional Communist and Socialist parties are
successfully adopting strategies to address left-libertarian and ecological issues
in their programmes, and are also to some extent capturing the electoral support
of those citizens concerned about these issues. In their competition with Green
and other libertarian parties, the success of these traditional parties in attracting
«new citizens» explains the basic continuity of their aggregate electoral support
(Kitschelt 1989 and 1990)35.
IU’s proximity to the postmaterialist items is particularly noteworthy. A
coalition of small little-known groups, some of which call themselves new social
movements, IU is in fact dominated by the Communist party. IU was formed in
1986 as a political alliance campaigning in favour of a negative vote in Spain’s
referendum on NATO in 1986. But the Socialists government’s decision to call an
early general election that same year served to consolidate IU as an electoral
coalition with a broader issue platform which included many postmaterialist
concerns besides its pacifist and anti-NATO positions. This explains the striking
change in the profiles of the electorates of the PCE and IU, even though their
similarly minority electoral support. After the transition to democracy and during
the early eighties the PCE followed a catch-all strategy, but was considered to be
a traditional left-wing party with a social base composed essentially of male
industrial workers, with low levels of education and a relatively high average age
(Linz et al. 1981). However, IU’s electoral consolidation in the early nineties was
based on the electoral support of typically communist voters, but also of much
younger voters, often university students or graduates, of both sexes, living in big
cities, and largely employed in the tertiary sector (Bosco 1995). In fact, IU has not
only has the most modern electorate of all the communist organizations of
Southern Europe, but is also the Spanish party with the largest proportion of
postmaterialist voters: in the early nineties, 39 per cent of its voters were
postmaterialists, compared with 19 per cent of those who voted for the PSOE,
and 13 per cent for the PP (Montero y Torcal 1992, 87).
The growing importance of postmaterialism in IU’s electoral support can be
seen from the data in Table 6, which shows the results of a logistic regression in
which electoral support for the coalition is the dependent variable. The materialist/
postmaterialist dimension is obviously important for predicting the vote for this
coalition, as are religiosity and sympathy for Comisiones Obreras (CC OO), the
union formerly linked with the Communist party and still ideologically closer to IU
than to the PSOE. The regression coefficients for all of these variables were
statistically significant, with the exception of subjective class position. It seems,
therefore, that at least since 1989 this «old party» has been very successful in
winning the electoral support of postmaterialists. Its success (together with the
fact that IU has never obtained more than 11 per cent of the vote) helps to explain
why value change has not had a major impact on the Spanish party system as a
whole. Certainly, no new political party has emerged to challenge IU’s strategy.
We argue, in common with many other scholars (Kistchelt 1990; Müller-Rommel
1990), that the appearance of «new parties» (more specifically, Green and Left-
libertarian parties), their electoral strength, and their distinct effect on the party
system, all primarily depend on the strategies the «old parties» devise to respond
to new issues.
The leaders of IU quickly developed an appropriate strategy.
Postmaterialist issues have increasingly become the core of the coalition’s
manifestos. This can clearly be seen, for example, with respect to ecological and
environmental issues. The evolution of the three PCE (1977, 1979, and 1982)
and four IU manifestos (1986, 1989, 1993, and 1996) shows major quantitative
and qualitative changes with respect to ecological and environmental questions.
There has been a notable increase in the number of lines dedicated to these
issues in the various manifestos36: the PCE devoted only two lines to these
questions in 1977, 31 in 1979, and 63 in 1982, accounting, respectively, for 1, 3,
and 4 per cent of the total in each case. Indicating its change of strategy, IU has
intensified its postmaterialist appeal both formally and substantially: the number
of lines on these issues rose to 7 per cent in 1986, 8 per cent in 1989, 6 per cent
in 1993 and 10 per cent in 1996. The 1993 decrease was due to the great length
the IU manifesto itself, which included a wide range of postmaterialist issues, as
well as to its greater complexity, which crystallized in a large number of
references to ecological and environmental issues in other sections of the
manifesto which were not counted for the purposes of this analysis. This change,
therefore, can be observed in both the number of lines and the increasing
importance assigned to postmaterialist issues. Since 1986, ecology and the
environment have occupied at least one full section of the IU manifesto, and since
1993, an entire chapter, comprising a large number of sections. Moreover, a
substantial change can also be seen in the contents of the coalition’s policy
proposals. The two lines included in the PCE’s 1977 manifesto, focusing on the
need for more parks and gardens, reflected a very traditional and superficial
approach. In 1986, IU’s manifesto contained a complete section on «policies for a
more ecological environment», although the approach was still rather traditional.
In 1993, a full chapter was devoted to ecology and the environment, which
included a number of different sections with radical proposals on the economy,
energy, environmental pollution, employment, global warming, tourism, education,
health, and many other issues. In 1996, the very first chapter of the IU manifesto
was devoted to «Ecologically Sustainable Economic and Social Development»:
the argument embodied in this title was at the heart of most of the policy
proposals presented by IU in the last general election37.
To what extent has IU’s electoral strategy been successful? Figure 5,
which shows the results of a non-metric multidimensional analysis of selected
materialist/ postmaterialist items and Spanish parties in 1992, shows that it has
been38. Green parties are closer to the postmaterialist items, but IU is also
competing for these «new citizens»39. The different spatial positions of IU and
the Green parties should also be noted. Although both are equidistant from the
item «protect the environment», the still dominant social concerns of IU voters
mean that the coalition is closer to the item «fight social inequalities», located
above it, and to the item «economic growth», placed below it. These social
concerns do not seem to be as significant as environmental issues for the
supporters of the Green parties.
In order to test this result, we carried out a further logistic regression, on
this occasion taking first IU and then the Green parties as the dependent variable.
The results in Table 7 show that two main cleavages (religiosity and materialism/
postmaterialism) influence the decision to vote for IU, but only one (materialism/
postmaterialism) the choice of the Green parties. It is safe to assume, therefore,
that the different definition of the spatial competition between these two electoral
forces is related to value change, and that generational replacement should have
a different impact on both. When the logistic regression was repeated with the
same variables but controlling by cohorts, the results clearly confirmed the distinct
character of their respective supporters (Table 8). In the case of IU, they are
young postmaterialists and old materialists, as the different signs of the
statistically significant logistic regression coefficients show for the postmaterialist
index for the youngest (0.4448) and oldest cohorts (-2.1559). The same is true in
terms of class: younger IU voters tend to identify themselves with the upper
classes, whereas older IU voters appear to belong to the working class. In an
illuminating contrast, no generational effect can be observed with respect to
religiosity, showing again the effects of secularization. In the case of the Green
parties, however, the same analysis does not produce any statistically significant
coefficients. Regardless of the cohort which their supporters belong to, the
materialist/postmaterialist dimension is the only relevant one for predicting the
vote for these parties.
Hence, we argue that value change produced by generational replacement
has had three effects on Spanish party politics. In the first place, it has resulted in
an increase in electoral support for both IU and the Green parties, as well as in
the competition between them on the postmaterialist dimension. Nevertheless,
until now this competition has proved extremely one-sided. IU has successfully
managed to transform itself from a typical communist party of the old left into the
main electoral option advancing the characteristic postmaterialist issues of the
new left. Thanks to this change, the Green parties appear to have lost their
electoral battle with IU. The moment of greatest support for the Green parties
came in the 1989 general elections, when the six different electoral lists won 1.7
per cent of the vote, and in the European elections held that year, when four
Green lists obtained 2.9 per cent of the vote, although in neither case did they win
any seats (Baras 1992). Since then, however, the relative growth of IU has
contrasted with the virtual disappearance of the Green parties: they won only 0.86
of the vote in the 1993 general elections, and 0.28 in 1996. Part of IU’s success
may be attributed to the errors made by the Green parties themselves. The Green
parties in Spain are among the most divided, and weakest, of all their Western
European counterparts. Their internal history of fragmentation and splits in a
context of electoral failures has reproduced the tendency seen in some other
Western Green parties. Their external strategy illustrates the hypothesis that
factors other than a pure logic of electoral competition sometimes shape the
dynamics of parties (Kitschelt 1989).
A second effect of value change on Spanish politics can be seen in the
heterogeneity of IU’s voters. Their very distinct profiles not only reflect the
habitual heterogeneity resulting from catch-all strategies, but above all the
differences between their voter’s basic preferences. For IU, value change has
created a potential basis for intra-party conflict between its blue-collar, staunchly
communist voters, its traditionally leftist lower-middle class electorate, and its
younger upper-middle class postmaterialists. In any event, the case of IU is rather
unique, even in Southern Europe (Bosco 1995): the PCE, through Izquierda
Unida, is the only Communist party which, whilst remaining so, has successfully
been able to channel a significant degree of support of postmaterialist voters;
support which until now has condemned the Green parties to being completely
marginal groups within the party system. In short, cultural change in Spain is
producing changes in a party rather than changes in the party system as a whole;
that is, value change is producing party change rather than party system change.
Moreover, and in the third place, value change in Spain is redefining to
some extent the spatial competition between parties on the left. In striking
contrast to many European party systems, in which Green parties compete
electorally with larger socialist parties (Müller-Rommel 1989 and 1994),
competition in Spain continues to be between IU and the PSOE. But this
competition is open, and still far from crystallized. In the early 1990s, the Socialist
Party’s long period in power explained the relatively scant presence of
postmaterialists among its electorate: only 19 per cent of PSOE voters, compared
with  39 per cent of those of IU, were postmaterialists in 1989 (Montero and
Torcal 1992). It will be remembered that Figure 5 provided eloquent graphic
confirmation of the position occupied by the PSOE. However, with its return to the
opposition in 1996 the competition between the two main parties on the left has
restarted. The outcome of this competition will hinge on how the major parties
address new issues emerging from value change, at the same as they deal with
the demands of their traditional electorates. More particularly, it will depend on
how successful IU is in processing simultaneously the demands of its potentially
conflicting groups of voters. It will also depend on how successful the Socialist
Party is in modernizing and renewing its electoral appeal from its place in the
parliamentary opposition, and hence in competing with IU for postmaterialist
voters on new grounds. Finally, it will also be influenced by the extent to which
the Spanish Green parties are able to overcome their “natural tendency”
(Kistchelt 1990) to division, and so move, if only a little, up the league table of
electoral support for Green parties in Europe. In this way, as in many other
Western European party systems, the distinct effects of value change on party
politics are conditioned by several political and institutional factors, as well as by
the different strategies adopted by political leaders40. The effects of value
change, combined with these intervening factors, may lead to either party change
or party system change, or both. In Spain, value change is only producing the
former, and is mainly restricted to the established left-wing parties, and above all
to the Communist-dominated coalition, IU.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined in some detail the formation of a new
cleavage as an empirical illustration of its impact on party politics. We began by
analyzing the magnitude of value change in Spain, and how recent economic,
social and political events contribute to a better understanding of the particular
character of change. The last three decades have seen enormous economic
growth, social modernization, and political change in Spain. Rapid economic
growth has generated comparable levels of wealth to most Western societies, but
also different levels of general economic security. The persistence of some major
social inequalities, combined with a still comparatively limited welfare state, has
created distinct levels of perception of economic goals and priorities among
Spaniards. This has produced a relatively large number of postmaterialists who
coexist with a majority of materialists.
As in many other Western countries, in Spain too generational replacement
or cohort effects seem to be one of the main driving forces behind cultural
change. Younger «new citizens» are slowly but surely replacing older materialist
generations. Postmaterialism, therefore, is relatively widespread among younger
cohorts, and it is precisely these citizens who are the source of changes in the
structure of political cleavages. As they enter the political arena, they are also the
potential source of change in the ideological definitions of parties which embrace
new values, and consequently of the party system. Thus, they play an extremely
important role in the formation of the new cleavage which results from value
change. In this paper we hope to have demonstrated that the political
consequences of value change can only be perceived if we take into account
generational replacement and the corresponding cohort effects.
But Spain also provides a useful opportunity to analyse the impact of value
change on the party system. In strong contrast to the axiomatic assumptions
frequently made with respect to the relationships between the three elements of a
cleavage (a social division, a common set of values, and an organization which
institutionalizes it), the Spanish case highlights the levels of  autonomy existing in
the organizational element. The leaders of the main left-wing parties were able to
prevent the emergence of new parties which expressed the political priorities of
these «new citizens». The leaders of the existing parties managed to attract these
postmaterialist voters and incorporate the postmaterialist dimension into the
established framework of electoral competition, whilst the Green parties,
paralysed by their leaders’ strategies of division and fragmentation, have been
unable to enter the party system. It is clear that the (few) voters of these new
parties are mostly postmaterialists, regardless of the cohort they belong to; but
these organizations have only obtained remarkably poor electoral results. Their
competitors on the left, IU and PSOE, have managed to capture the
postmaterialist vote, but they have also experienced a number of changes as
result of values change. Generational replacement is having particularly important
consequences for the composition of the electorate of IU, the coalition which has
proved most successful in capturing the support of «new citizens». This process
is increasing the heterogeneity of IU, and hence, the potential for intra-party
conflict between the younger and older generations, as well as between its
sometimes rather incompatible policy aims. Thus, the effects of value change are
largely fuelling a process of party change, rather than party system change.
Can this trend be expected to continue as the number of postmaterialists
rises in Spain? The change observed, unusual as it may be if one remembers
that the successful competitor of the Green parties is an electoral coalition
dominated by the Spanish Communist party, has not modified the position of IU
within the party system. The PSOE still enjoys a large number of competitive
advantages with respect to IU -in terms of its leaders, voters, resources, and
institutional presence. Despite the significant proportion of postmaterialists in
Spanish society, and the intensity of generational replacement in value change,
the strategies developed by the leaders of IU and the PSOE have reinforced the
relative autonomy of the party elites insofar as they have been able to prevent the
emergence of an autonomous organization from the postmaterialist cleavage. Up
to now at least, this margin of manoeuvre for interparty competition has been
translated into some changes within the parties, but the party system itself has
not been modified by the entry of new parties or more significant changes in any
of the existing parties.
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1. The electoral instability of the 1970s has been disputed by some scholars. Ersson and Lane (1982) and
Shamir (1984), for example, have found that the aggregate electoral results since the beginning of the century
show remarkable patterns of stability as well as instability. Nevertheless, in a more comprehensive study,
Bartolini and Mair (1990) have supported the stability hypothesis with data from the period since 1885.
2. Whereas  party change alludes to changes occurring in one or various parties in a given system, party
system change refers to changes taking place in the party system itself (Mair 1989 and 1990; Bartolini and
Mair 1990). For other definitions of party change and party system change see Laver (1989), Smith (1989),
and Harmel and Janda (1994).
3. The 1980 and 1989 surveys were conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). The
1980 survey was undertaken in November, and 1989 survey in January. The surveys for 1991, 1992, 1993
and 1994 were carried out in June of those years by the Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social
(CIRES).
4. In Table 1 we have defined individuals in accordance with their factor scores on the
materialist/postmaterialist dimension (first principal component); we have used the regression method to
create and save the factor scores.
5. Studies carried out in 1990 (Orizo 1991, 43-46) confirm the constant increase in postmaterialists (20
percent) and mixed individuals (58 percent), and the consequent decline in materialists (22 percent). This
distribution seems to dilute the peculiar importance of materialists in Spain, apparently indicating that the
significant increase in the proportion of mixed individuals has taken place at the expense of the materialists.
Although the results of Orizo’s study also confirm the cultural change hypothesis, he used a rather different
method to ours when assigning respondents to the categories of materialist, mixed, and postmaterialist
(Montero and Torcal 1992, 71).
6. The Spanish economy grew by an average of 7.3 per cent per year in real terms between 1961 and 1970.
This growth led to the profound modernization of Spanish society. In 1960, for example, 41.5 per cent of the
active population was employed in the primary, 23.3 per cent in the secondary, and 28.1 per cent in the
tertiary sector. In 1991, the distribution of the active population was 10.3, 21.3, and 51.9 per cent respectively
(see Cuadrado Roura 1990). For comparative data on economic growth for this period, see Van Deth (1995,
51-60).
7. A cohort is defined as «those people within a geographically or otherwise delineated population who
experienced the same significant life event within a given period of time» (Glenn 1977, 8). Cohort boundaries
can be arbitrarily defined in terms of «any standard period of time», or can be based on some historical
events. In this study we have set the cohort boundaries in reference to a number of historical, social, and
economic events in recent Spanish history. For a more detailed explanation, see Torcal (1989).
8. Torcal (1992) has stressed the significance of cohorts for the definition of the materialist/postmaterialist
dimension, and has demonstrated that value change in Spain follows a clear time developmental model or
circular dimensionality, in which the younger the cohort, the closer its position to the most postmaterialist and
libertarian items. For the concept of circular dimensionality, see also Weisberg (1974).
9. Unfortunately, a linear relationship between cohort, period and age effects leads each  to be confused with
the other. Thus, these effects cannot be clearly distinguished from Figure 1 alone. The influence of these
three effects is difficult to discern for two additional reasons. As noted by Glenn (1977, 12), first, because in
survey data «much of the variation in percentages (or other values) among cells of a cohort table reflects
sampling variability», and second, because «as a birth cohort grows older, it suffers attrition due to the death
of some of its members».
10. Some authors use the adjective longitudinal to refer to both cohort trend studies with repeated cross-
sectional studies and panel studies (Glenn 1977; Menard 1991), whereas other terminological purists only
apply this adjective to panel studies (Campbell and Stanley 1963).
11. These dummy variables were created from a cohort table using only two years (1989 and 1993). The
intervals of age and cohort have to correspond exactly with the interval of time between the surveys.
Therefore, age and cohort were grouped in five-year intervals, which correspond to the five years between
these two surveys (1989-1993). We obtained nine five-year intervals of cohort and age, excluding, for
theoretical reasons, those individuals over sixty. This is also the reason why we could not include more
periods in the model. The interval of time between the other surveys was different, making it impossible to
include them in the model. For a detailed discussion of this model, see Mason et al. (1973).
12. Tolerance among all these variables was very low, and the variance-inflation factor (VIF) very high,
indicating high collinearity among the variables. Linear relationships between the independent variables make
the least-squares regression coefficients unstable. Coefficient standard errors are inflated, leading to the
possibility that the null hypothesis might not be rejected when it is in fact not true (error type II). Small changes
in the data may substantially modify the regression coefficients, whilst scarcely raising the sum of squared
residuals (SME). See Fox (1991, 10-21).
13. To confirm the statistical significance of some of the cohort variables, we performed a Joint Hypothesis
Testing for Collinearity, finding a significant F statistic. Multicollinearity among these variables was, therefore,
causing us to fail to reject the null hypothesis.
14. These are standard procedures in many longitudinal studies attempting to evaluate period, cohort, and
age effects. For a detailed discussion of these questions, including some applications, see Menard (1992).
15. Graaf and Evans (1996, 612) state that the «advantages of so doing are twofold. First, the identification
problem can be solved, and second the predictions become more informative because the characteristics that
should impact on a given dependent variable are clearly specified».
16. Graaf and Evans (1996, 627) also maintain that the severity of war experiences and education are the
most important predictors of postmaterial values.
17. In a more detailed analysis, Graaf and Evans (1996, 627) reach the same conclusion, although the
preferential relation between education and postmaterialism could have more implications than those
considered by Inglehart (1990a and 1995).
18. The Spanish unemployment rate was 5.7 per cent in 1977, reached a maximum of 24.1 per cent in 1994,
and stood at 22.4 per cent in 1996.
19. Party identification in Spain is only a secondary variable for the analysis of political conflicts and electoral
behavior. Regardless of the measure used, the levels of party identification observed among Spaniards are
extremely low (Gunther and Montero 1994).
20. We had to use the subjective dimension of class, as reflected in survey answers to the question «What
social class do you think you belong to?» We would have like to have had some other variables to measure
objective social class, but unfortunately they were not included in this survey. Income was, however, included
in the CIRES surveys, but it was not found to be statistically significant.
21. The variable used here is the frequency of church attendance. Because of the small number of cases, we
have not included any variable measuring regional conflicts, which are obviously extremely relevant in
Catalonia and the Basque Country.
22. We grouped the six cohorts of Figure 1 into three cohorts, creating dichotomous variables with each. We
multiplied the two youngest and oldest cohorts by each variable measuring some political cleavage. Finally,
we regressed the left-right scale on those new variables representing the interaction of political cleavages with
older and younger cohorts.
23. The survey, codirected by Richard Gunther, Francisco Llera, José María Maravall, José Ramón Montero,
and Francesc Pallarès, was carried out by DATA, and financed by the CICYT (SEC95-1007), as part of the
Comparative National Election Project (CNEP).
24. The ten issue scales, ranging from 1 to 10, were as follows: (1) «Defend our traditional religious and moral
values» vs. «Defend the individual right to be and belief whatever he or she wants»; (2) «Protect the
environment to make our cities and countryside more habitable and beautiful» vs. «Promote economic growth
without environmental restrictions on corporations»; (3) «Improve social and public services» vs. «Cut taxes»;
(4) «Distribute income more evenly» vs. «Create more incentives for individual improvement»; (5) “Nurture the
European Union» vs. «Maintain Spain’s national independence»; (6) «Maintain order» vs. «Defend individual
rights»; (7) «Privatize public corporations» vs. «Maintain the existing public corporations»; (8) «Declare
abortion illegal» vs. «Declare abortion legal»; (9) «Work hard and compete for individual improvement» vs.
«Maintain solidarity, and not competition, with workmates and a good atmosphere in the workplace»; and (10)
«Increase citizens’ participation in important governmental decisions» vs. «Allow the government to make
rapid decisions based on its expertise».
25. For a detailed analysis of the strength of this authoritarian/libertarian dimension as a component of the
materialist/postmaterialist conflict see Torcal (1992).
26. The regression obtained was the following: _=4.646- 0.983X1 + 0.270X2 - 0.564X3 + 0.000X4. All the
coefficients were statically significant for p< 0.05 with the exception of b4.
27. It would have been better to treat these interactions as dummy variables, but in this 1993 survey age has
already been grouped into seven categories, making it impossible to repeat the cohort analysis performed
above
28. The different positions on the scale were measured through dichotomous variables.
29. This fact explains the position of issues, such as «fight social inequalities», close to the postmaterialist
items. For a detailed discussion of the interactions between the two conflicts see Torcal (1992). For the
concept of sociotropic interest, see Kinder and Kiewiet (1979).
30. In the 1993 survey a 1-7 ideological scale was used. In this way we grouped these values as follows:
(position 1) extreme-left; (2 and 3) left and centre-left; (4) centre; (5 and 6) right and centre-right; and (7)
extreme-right.
31. In the four general elections held between 1982 and 1993, the Socialist Party won between of 48.4 and
38.8 per cent of the vote (between 58 and 45 per cent of the seats), which allowed it to form single-party
governments. Support for the conservative party rose from 26 per cent of the vote in the eighties to 34.8 per
cent (40 per cent of the seats) in 1993. In the 1996 elections, the PP won power with 38.8 per cent of the vote
(45 per cent of the seats), whilst the Socialist Party returned to the opposition with 37.5 per cent of the vote
(40 per cent of the seats).
32. During the eighties, the Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) and later IU won between
4 and 9 per cent of the vote. In the 1996 elections IU obtained 10.6 per cent of the vote and 6 per cent of
parliamentary seats.
33. In the last elections, their combined share of votes and seats was some 6 percent, but their strategic
position has enabled them to play a decisive role in supporting the minority governments of the PSOE and
then the PP.
34. We had to exclude the regional (and most significantly the Catalan and Basque) parties from this
multidimensional analysis due to the small number of cases, and in spite of the prominent role they play within
the Spanish party system.
35. In the Spanish case, the success of the traditional parties has been favoured by the persistent
organizational and electoral failure of the Green parties. Since the mid-eighties, their leaders have proved
incapable of implementing strategies of fusion of the numerous groups existing, of reducing the excessive
number of lists presented in elections, or avoiding highly divisive ideological disputes. See Baras (1992).
36. Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge et al. (1994, 272) use sentences as quantitative units for their analyses of
election manifestos. Although their system seems more reliable, for the purpose of this paper we have relied
in the simpler technique of counting lines rather than sentences.
37. We should also mention that IU has adopted different names in some Spanish regions, some of which
refer to the Verdes (Greens). For instance, according to the Fourth Federal Assembly hold in 1994, IU’s
official name in Andalusia is Izquierda Unida Los Verdes-Convocatoria por Andalucía ; and in Catalonia,
Iniciativa per Catalunya-Els Verds.
38. The  postelectoral 1993 survey reflects some short-term effects produced by the election campaign. For
this reason, we have opted to use the 1992 survey in this part of the paper.
39. It should be noted that the Green parties were not included in the questionnaire in 1989, and therefore we
could not take them into account in Figure 5.
40. For a more detailed discussion of the sources of change and constraints in party politics, see
Rohrchneider (1993).
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